This paper estimates the impact of corporate income tax rates on corporate tax revenue at the state level over the period 1996-2007 to determine the existence and shape of a Laffer curve for state corporate income taxes. Standard theoretical constructs are used to characterize corporate income tax revenues as a quadratic function of the corporate tax rate. Empirical results using linear, log-log, and semi-log 
Introduction
The global recession that began in 2007 has wrecked havoc on the government budgets of individual states in the U.S. States have seen their tax revenues fall while their spending needs have risen. As consumer expenditures have declined dramatically, business investment has fallen in tow. To stimulate economic activity, various tax cuts have been proposed at both the federal and state levels.
One that has gained traction is the proposal to decrease the state corporate income tax (SCIT) rate. It has been suggested that the SCIT is inefficient due to the distortions it creates in the economy and that lower SCIT rates are often associated with greater investment and higher wages. Tax-cut proponents argue that reductions in the SCIT rate would spur business investment and slow, if not stem, the steady increase in unemployment. For example, the governor of Rhode Island, Donald Carcieri, has proposed a four-year phase out of its 9% SCIT rate to become "competitive and attract new and existing businesses". Some economists and politicians have suggested these effects may be so large that SCIT revenues may actually rise with decreased rates. In other words, current SCIT rates may be on the "right side" of a SCIT Laffer curve. Whether or not this is true depends first upon whether a Laffer curve exits for the SCIT.
The theory supporting the corporate tax Laffer curve is that changes in CIT rates affect firm behavior and by such behavior, the tax base. Behavioral changes manifest themselves via decisions on investment, employment, employee compensation, location, and compliance. A significant body of empirical support exists for these claims. Early literature on these effects focus on the federal corporate income tax (FCIT) beginning with Harberger (1966) who estimated that the distortions created by it sum to a cost of about 24 percent of FCIT revenues. Later researchers have estimated the costs of the FCIT to exceed half of the revenues it generates (see Gravelle (1994) and Fullerton and Rogers (1993) ).
Measures of the marginal efficiency cost of the FCIT -that is, the cost of raising one additional dollar of tax revenue from it -further bolsters the idea. Jorgensen and Yun (1991) provide a widely-cited estimate of the FCIT marginal efficiency cost of $0.45 compared to $0.52 for income taxes, $0.38 for payroll taxes and $0.26 for sales taxes. 1 Estimates of the compliance costs of the FCIT are also large, estimated at 5.9 percent of firm tax expenses (Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) ). This percentage is about double the federal corporate income tax percentage cost (Gupta and Mills (2002)) .
At the state level, Harden and Hoyt (2003) show that state and local taxes negatively affect employment levels and that the SCIT has the largest negative impact on employment growth. , 1997-2005 . Location decisions are also negatively affected by higher SCIT rates. Newman (1983) found that differences in SCIT rates influenced the movement of industry to southern states where rates were lower. A later study by Agostini and Tulayasathein (2001) found the SCIT rate to be the most influential tax on investment decisions by foreign corporations. Empirical evidence suggests that compliance is negatively related to SCIT rates (see >>>>). Such behavioral responses support the existence of a Laffer curve.
Though there are many empirical studies of CIT Laffer curves at the national and international level, no tests of a Laffer curve have been conducted at the state-wide level. This is surprising as statewide comparisons do not suffer from many of the problems inherent to cross-country comparisons. In particular, individual states within the U.S. experience similar technology, inflation rates, banking and financial regulation, labor market conditions, capital mobility and many other conditions that are not shared across countries. Moreover, the data itself is likely to be collected in a more consistent manner across states than across countries. Within this consistency there exists sufficient variability in rates and tax revenues over states and over time to provide a robust data set. This paper follows standard theoretical constructs by modeling the impact of SCIT rates on corporate revenues as a quadratic function for the years 1996-2007. Total SCIT revenues, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of real gross state product, are used as dependent variables.
Empirical results using linear, log-log, and semi-log econometric specifications support the hypothesis of the existence of a Laffer curve whose revenue-maximizing SCIT rate has declined over time. The rates range from 8.52% to 9.32% for the time period 1996-2002 and 6.03% to 7.47% over the time The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the literature on CIT Laffer curves.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 examines the data and methodology. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Literature on Laffer Curves
One of the early econometric studies of Laffer curves in the United States is Hsing (1994) . Using national data for the U.S. from 1959-1991, Hsing regressed real personal income tax revenue against the average personal income tax rate using linear, log-log and semi-log specifications. He found a statistically significant quadratic Laffer curve for personal income taxes with a revenue-maximizing tax rate between 32.67% and 35.21%. Studies of Laffer curves for CIT rates follow a similar procedure but incorporate multiple countries over multiple time periods. Regression results from these pooled data sets have revealed a statistically significant Laffer curve exists for corporate taxes. Clausing (2007) Clausing (2007) and Brill and Hassett (2007) to SCIT data.
The Model
The impact of CIT rates on firm profits and decisions on investing, location, and employee compensation are extensive. The literature reveals the relationship to be complex and nonlinear. Rather than attempt to estimate these individual impacts on firm behavior, the CIT Laffer curve captures the firms' behavioral responses in a simple, reduced form. To model the relationship, it will be necessary to control for factors that are non-behavioral but may significantly affect the tax base. Three such factors are the throwback rule, apportionment formula, and a state's allocation of its revenues.
The apportionment formula arose because many corporations operate in multiple states simultaneously. The formula is used to divide a multi-state firm's income among the states with which the firm has sufficient contact. Each state must determine what fraction of a company's income was earned in its state and therefore subject to their CIT. The fraction depends on the state's apportionment formula which provides weights for three factors: company payroll, property, and sales. For example, a state with a 100% weight on company payroll would not collect taxes from companies that sell to that state but do not have any reported workers there. Another state might weight them equally: 33% payroll, 33% property, and 33% sales. The trend has been toward a heavier weight on sales. An apportionment formula divides a multistate firm's taxable income, π i , among its different jurisdictions.
Firm i's tax expense, x i , is given by weights in state i for sales, payroll, and property, respectively, that sum to 1. Recent research suggests the throwback and allocation rules are important to firm behavior. For example, Gupta and Hofmann (2003) find that marginal capital investment in the manufacturing sector is affected most by the throwback requirement, the apportionment weights and by the state income tax rate itself. In particular, Gupta and Hofmann (2003) find that the SCIT rate has a significant negative impact on firm investment in manufacturing. Using state data from 1983 to 1996, the authors show that a one percent decrease in the "property burden" (the product of the property factor weight times the SCIT) results in a 0.05 to 0.35 percent increase in new capital spending. The authors also conclude that the lack of a throwback rule is viewed as a major incentive for business investment. 
Assuming a positive coefficient for Rate i,t and a negative one for Rate i,t 2 , the function will have the following bell-like shape shown in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 Here]
With SCIT revenues on the vertical axis and the SCIT rate on the horizontal, the Laffer curve is graphed as an inverted hyperbola whose peak occurs at the point t Rev-Max , R max . As logic requires, both a SCIT rate of zero and 100% will create no revenues. SCIT rates to the right and left of t Rev-Max result in lower tax revenues. Any marginal tax cut starting from a point to the right of the peak will raise revenues.
Any marginal tax cut starting from a point to the left of the peak will lower revenues.
To estimate the SCIT Laffer curve, four econometric specifications are used. The first is the familiar linear form which serves as the benchmark specification and is given by
where e t represents the error term that is approximately normally distributed with a variance of σ 2 -i.e., . Any state whose top SCIT rate is above this rate is on the right side of the Laffer curve. At such a position, a decrease in tax rates will incentivize firm production and investment such that the SCIT base expands and tax revenues rise.
The benchmark linear specification is compared to the following three functional forms. 
Whereas the coefficient in (2) represented a slope estimate, the coefficient in the log-log form, (3), represents the elasticity of tax revenues to tax rates. Revenue-maximizing tax rates for equations (3) and (5) 
Data and Methodology
The sample consists of data from 50 states over eleven years, from 1996 to 2007 giving a total of 600 Different estimates of the relevant SCIT rate are possible as some states have flat tax rates and others graduated. The common procedure for time-series national studies and panel estimates of international CIT rates is to use the top tax rate for reporting and analysis which is sensible if the majority of corporate revenues are subject to the top SCIT rate. 4 The same practice has been used in statewide studies such as Felix (2009) For these reasons, the econometric models were run on three sets of data. The first set includes all states (50); the second set, all states with nonzero SCIT rates (45 states); the third set excludes all zero SCIT rate states and outliers (42 states). [ Figure 2 Here]
The figure appears to illustrate a change in the relationship between rates and revenues between the two periods. In particular, both rates and revenues trended downward from 1996-2002 but then revenues experienced a steady increase from 2004-2007. 10 This change in trends supports the notion of a structural break in the data at 2003 which was found to be statistically significant using the Chow
Test.
11
All model specifications had F values that exceeded the critical F values and therefore support the existence of a structural break. In addition, the t-stats,R Both a state-specific effect and period-specific effect that alter the Laffer curve's intercept were found to be statistically significant for all regressions at the 0.0001% level, except the linear-log model.
12
A fixed effects specification was chosen over a random effects model because the former applies when the cross sectional units are assumed not to be random drawings from a larger population.
This clearly holds when comparing states.
13
Finally, all errors were corrected using a White's (diagonal) correction method.
Empirical Results
There [ Table 1 Here]
The Jarque-Bera (JB) test was used to examine the normality of the residuals for all models. For the linear model, the JB score reveals that only 4 states had a JB probability below 0.20 for the 50 states 14 Nearly all Durbin-Watson values were within ranges to suggest neither autocorrelation nor modeling misspecification exists.
15
[ is not comparable for different dependent variables adjustments were made to the goodnessof-fit measures to compare the log-log and linear models (Gujarati p.219) . Neither log-log nor linear modelR 2 s appeared significantly better than the other after the appropriate adjustments. Next, the MacKinnon, White and Davidson test was applied to the linear and log-log models to compare the functional forms. Again neither model proved better than the other. In the end, the linear, log-log, and
log-linear models all appear to be robust using both real SCIT revenues per capita and real SCIT revenues per capita over GSP as dependent variables. Taken Laffer curve is from the linear model which gives the revenue-maximizing SCIT rate of 6.03%; the lower is from the log-linear model which gives the revenue-maximizing SCIT rate of 7.46%. Though the Laffer curve heights are notably different, it is important to note that the peak tax rates are very near one another.
[ Figure 4 Here]
Conclusion
This paper provides a first-cut analysis of the impact of corporate income tax cuts on government revenues at the state level. The topic is timely as at least 47 states are facing significant budget shortfalls in the midst of the current recession. percentage point increase, however, would put it well to the right of the Laffer peak. This paper predicts that, ceteris paribus, SCIT revenues will rise for the three tax-cutting states while Maryland's and Illinois' CIT revenues will decline. 
